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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In this insurance coverage dispute, Auto-Owners 
Insurance Company (“Auto-Owners”) seeks a declaration that 
it has no obligation to defend or indemnify its insured, 
Stevens & Ricci, Inc. (“Stevens & Ricci”), in connection with 
a $2,000,000 judgment entered against Stevens & Ricci as 
part of the settlement of a class action lawsuit.  In that class 
action, the Hymed Group Corporation (“Hymed”) alleged, as 
representative of the class, that Stevens & Ricci had violated 
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. 
§ 227, by sending unsolicited fax advertisements.  While that 
class action was pending, Auto-Owners filed this declaratory 
judgment action in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania against both Stevens & Ricci 
and Hymed.1  Auto-Owners and Hymed filed cross-motions 
for summary judgment.  In its motion, Auto-Owners argued 
that the terms of the insurance policy did not obligate it to 
indemnify or defend Stevens & Ricci in the class action; 
Hymed argued, to the contrary, that the policy required Auto-
Owners to pay the judgment on behalf of its insured.2  The 
                                              
 1 By agreement of the parties, the declaratory judgment 
action was heard before a magistrate judge, who was thus 
empowered to enter final judgment.  28 U.S.C. § 636(c).   
 
 2 As more fully explained herein, Hymed, rather than 
Stevens & Ricci, ended up making these coverage arguments 
because Stevens & Ricci settled its stake in the coverage 
dispute in a manner that effectively made Hymed the party 
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District Court concluded that the sending of unsolicited fax 
advertisements in violation of the TCPA did not fall within 
the terms of the insurance policy, and thus granted Auto-
Owners’s motion for summary judgment and denied Hymed’s 
cross-motion.  Because we agree that the insurance policy 
does not cover the judgment in the underlying class action, 
we will affirm. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
 This case began with the improper use of what now 
seems an old-fashioned method of communication: fax 
machines.  Stevens & Ricci was solicited by an advertiser 
claiming to have a fax advertising program that complied 
with the TCPA.  Relying on that representation, Stevens & 
Ricci allowed the advertiser to fax thousands of 
advertisements to potential customers on its behalf.  The 
advertiser sent 18,879 unsolicited advertisements by fax in 
February 2006.   
 
 Much later, on June 1, 2012, Hymed filed a class 
action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Stevens & Ricci, 
claiming that the advertisements actually did violate the 
TCPA, see Hymed Grp. Corp. v. Stevens & Ricci, Inc., Civil 
Action No. 12-CV-3093 (the “Underlying Action”), which 
prohibits the “use [of] any telephone facsimile machine, 
computer, or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile 
machine, an unsolicited advertisement … .”  47 U.S.C. 
§ 227(b)(1)(C).  Hymed asserted that it and other class 
                                                                                                     
most interested in securing coverage.  See infra at pp. 6-7, 9 
n.7. 
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members – numbering, per the complaint, “more than 39 
other recipients” (J.A. at 545) – had not invited or given 
permission to Stevens & Ricci to send the faxes.  Hymed’s 
complaint further charged that the unsolicited faxes had 
damaged the recipients by causing them to waste paper and 
toner consumed in the printing process and to lose the use of 
their fax machines when the advertisements were being 
received.  In Hymed’s words, the “junk faxes” had also 
interrupted the class members’ “privacy interest in being left 
alone.”  (J.A. at 549-50.)  For relief, Hymed sought actual or 
statutory damages, whichever was greater, and an injunction 
against future violations.  Given the volume of faxes sent, a 
finding of liability to the class under the TCPA, with statutory 
damages of $500 per fax, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), could 
have resulted in a damage award in the Underlying Action of 
$9,439,500, before trebling.3  Such a judgment could have 
bankrupted Stevens & Ricci and caused the dissolution of its 
business.   
 
 During the time that Stevens & Ricci had the 
unsolicited faxes sent to Hymed and other class members, it 
was covered by a “Businessowners Insurance Policy” (the 
“Policy”) issued by Auto-Owners.  (J.A. at 555.)  The Policy 
obligates Auto-Owners to “pay those sums that the insured 
becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of 
‘bodily injury’, ‘property damage’, ‘personal injury’ or 
‘advertising injury’ to which this insurance applies.”  (J.A. at 
563.)  The present dispute centers on whether the sending of 
unsolicited faxes inflicted two of those four types of injury on 
                                              
 3 The TCPA permits trebling of statutory damages if 
the defendant acted “willfully or knowingly” in violating the 
statute.  47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 
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the members of the class: property damage and advertising 
injury. 
 
 The term “property damage” is defined in the Policy as 
“[p]hysical injury to tangible property, including all resulting 
loss of use of that property.”  (J.A. at 576.)  For “property 
damage” to be covered under the Policy, it must be caused by 
an “occurrence” (J.A. at 563), which the Policy defines as an 
“accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 
substantially the same general harmful conditions” (J.A. at 
575).  Despite its use of the term, the Policy does not 
separately define an “accident,” though it does exclude from 
coverage any property damage “expected or intended from 
the standpoint of the insured.”  (J.A. at 564-65.) 
 
 The Policy defines “advertising injury” as injury 
arising out of one or more of the following events: 
 
a. Oral or written publication of material that 
slanders or libels a person or organization or 
disparages a person’s or organization’s goods, 
products or services; 
 
b. Oral or written publication of material that 
violates a person’s right of privacy; 
 
c. Misappropriation of advertising ideas or style 
of doing business; or 
 
d. Infringement of copyright, title or slogan. 
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(J.A. at 573.)  To be covered, an “advertising injury” must 
also be inflicted “in the course of advertising [the insured’s] 
goods, products or services.”  (J.A. at 563.) 
 
 Auto-Owners agreed to defend Stevens & Ricci in the 
Underlying Action, but reserved its right to later challenge 
whether the alleged misconduct (i.e., the sending of 
unsolicited faxes) fell within the terms of the insurance 
policy’s coverage.  In November 2013, Hymed, Stevens & 
Ricci, and Auto-Owners reached an agreement to 
compromise and settle the Underlying Action.  Among other 
things, the parties agreed to entry of judgment in favor of the 
class, and against Stevens & Ricci, in the amount of 
$2,000,000.  Hymed and the class also agreed to seek 
recovery to satisfy the judgment only from Auto-Owners 
under the Policy.  On December 4, 2014, the District Court in 
the Underlying Action entered an order and final judgment 
approving the settlement and entering the judgment against 
Stevens & Ricci.  In its order, the Court specifically found 
that Stevens & Ricci “did not willfully or knowingly violate 
the TCPA.”  (J.A. at 24.) 
 
 By that time, Auto-Owners had already filed this case 
to clarify its obligations under the Policy.  In particular, on 
December 28, 2012, Auto-Owners filed the present 
declaratory judgment action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, 
against Stevens & Ricci and Hymed, seeking a declaration 
that the Policy did not provide coverage for Hymed’s claims 
in the Underlying Action and that Auto-Owners thus did not 
owe Stevens & Ricci any duty to defend or indemnify.4  It 
                                              
 4 Hymed had previously filed a declaratory judgment 
action on the coverage question in the United States District 
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filed an amended complaint on January 3, 2013.  Stevens & 
Ricci never entered an appearance or filed a response.5  Auto-
Owners and Hymed each moved for summary judgment, and 
the District Court concluded that the sending of unsolicited 
faxes to Hymed and other class members did not cause the 
sort of injury that falls within the Policy’s definition of either 
“property damage” or “advertising injury.”  Accordingly, the 
Court granted Auto-Owners’s motion for summary judgment 
                                                                                                     
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.  That case was 
dismissed for improper venue, because venue was proper in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, where the Underlying Action was then 
pending.  See Hymed Grp. Corp. v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., No. 
12-12519, 2012 WL 6642645 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 20, 2012).  
On the day that case was dismissed, Hymed filed another 
declaratory judgment action, this time in the Western District 
of Michigan.  That case was then transferred to the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania and consolidated with the instant 
case in April 2014 by agreement of the parties.  The parties 
stipulated that Hymed’s declaratory judgment complaint 
would be treated as a counterclaim in the case filed by Auto-
Owners.   
 
 5 It appears that, despite having been served, Stevens 
& Ricci never filed an answer to Auto-Owners’s amended 
complaint seeking a declaratory judgment.  The District Court 
did not issue a default judgment against it, however, opting 
instead to dismiss Auto-Owners’s motion for a default 
judgment without prejudice to Auto-Owners’s opportunity to 
argue later, in its motion for summary judgment, that 
declaratory relief should be granted against all defendants, 
including the absent Stevens & Ricci. 
9 
 
and denied Hymed’s cross-motion.  Hymed promptly 
appealed.   
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
 A. Jurisdiction 
 
 This is an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 
28 U.S.C. § 2201.  That Act does not itself create an 
independent basis for federal jurisdiction but instead provides 
a remedy for controversies otherwise properly within the 
court’s subject matter jurisdiction.  Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips 
Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671-72 (1950).  In bringing its 
action, Auto-Owners invoked the District Court’s diversity 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, which has two 
requirements for the establishment of jurisdiction.  First, the 
parties must be completely diverse, meaning that “no plaintiff 
can be a citizen of the same state as any of the defendants.”  
Grand Union Supermarkets of the V.I., Inc. v. H.E. Lockhart 
Mgmt., Inc., 316 F.3d 408, 410 (3d Cir. 2003).  For 
jurisdictional purposes, “a corporation is a citizen of both its 
state of incorporation and the state ‘where it has its principal 
place of business.’”  Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 
724 F.3d 337, 347 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(c)(1)).  Here, there is no dispute that the parties are 
completely diverse: Auto-Owners is based and incorporated 
in Michigan, while Stevens & Ricci is based and incorporated 
in Arizona, and Hymed is based and incorporated in 
Pennsylvania.6 
                                              
 6 We need not address the citizenship of the various 
unnamed members of the class.  For one, those unnamed 
individuals are not parties to this declaratory judgment action.  
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 The second requirement for federal jurisdiction under 
the diversity statute is that the “matter in controversy exceeds 
the sum or value of $75,000 … .”  28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).  
Meeting that requirement here is not as straightforward as it 
may first appear.  Although Auto-Owners and Hymed are 
ultimately fighting over the insurer’s need to pay a 
$2,000,000 judgment against its insured, that judgment is 
based on the settlement of an underlying class action lawsuit 
in which the individual claims of each class member fell well 
below the $75,000 amount-in-controversy threshold.  In 
general, the distinct claims of separate plaintiffs cannot be 
aggregated when determining the amount in controversy.  
Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661, 666 (3d Cir. 
2002).  Given that anti-aggregation rule, we solicited 
supplemental briefing from the parties to address “whether 
and how the amount-in-controversy requirement for federal 
diversity jurisdiction is met in this case.” 7  Hymed now 
                                                                                                     
Even if this were the Underlying Action, “in a federal class 
action only the citizenship of the named class representatives 
must be diverse from that of the defendants.”  In re Sch. 
Asbestos Litig., 921 F.2d 1310, 1317 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
 7 We also solicited supplemental briefing on the 
question of whether Hymed has proper Article III standing, as 
required for jurisdiction, “to participate in an action seeking a 
declaration of rights under an insurance contract to which it is 
not a party.”  On that issue, the parties agree – correctly – that 
Hymed does have standing.  That standing is rooted in our 
previous recognition that, in a declaratory judgment action 
concerning the scope of an insurance policy, “the injured 
party has an independent right to present its case upon the 
ultimate issues, apart from that of the insured, because ‘in 
11 
 
argues that the District Court’s exercise of diversity 
jurisdiction ran afoul of the anti-aggregation rule, and the 
Court thus acted without jurisdiction in granting Auto-
Owners’s motion for summary judgment.8 
 
 As the party invoking diversity jurisdiction, Auto-
Owners bears the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.  
Judon v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 773 F.3d 495, 506-
07 (3d Cir. 2014).  But that burden is not especially onerous.  
In reviewing the complaint, “the sum claimed by the plaintiff 
controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith.  It must 
appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than 
the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal.”  St. Paul 
                                                                                                     
many of the liability insurance cases, the most real dispute is 
between the injured third party and the insurance company, 
not between the injured and oftentimes impecunious 
insured.’”  Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Murray, 658 F.3d 311, 319 
(3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. Kemper Ins. Co. v. Rauscher, 
807 F.2d 345, 354 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
 
 8 It is perhaps not a coincidence that Hymed only 
discovered its concern about the District Court’s jurisdiction 
after losing in that Court.  But, because the amount-in-
controversy issue goes to jurisdiction, it is immaterial that it 
only arose on appeal.  As we have previously held, “if it 
develops that the requisite amount in controversy was never 
present, even if that fact is not established until the case is on 
appeal, the judgment of the District Court cannot stand.”  
Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 
218 (3d Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by Exxon 
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005). 
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Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 
(1938).  “Accordingly, the question whether a plaintiff’s 
claims pass the ‘legal certainty’ standard is a threshold matter 
that should involve the court in only minimal scrutiny of the 
plaintiff’s claims.”  Suber v. Chrysler Corp., 104 F.3d 578, 
583 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
 In making that assessment, “[t]he temporal focus of the 
court’s evaluation … is on the time that the complaint was 
filed.”  Id.; see also Kaufman v. Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 561 
F.3d 144, 152 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[U]nder a long-standing rule, 
federal diversity jurisdiction is generally determined based on 
the circumstances prevailing at the time the suit was filed.”).  
Subsequent events cannot reduce the amount in controversy 
so as to deprive the district court of jurisdiction, St. Paul 
Mercury Indem., 303 U.S. at 293, nor can later events 
increase the amount in controversy and give rise to 
jurisdiction that did not properly exist at the time of the 
complaint’s filing.  For our purposes, that means we assess 
whether Auto-Owners met the amount-in-controversy 
threshold by considering only the circumstances that existed 
in January 2013, when Auto-Owners filed its amended 
complaint in this case.  Because that was long before the 
parties reached their $2,000,000 settlement of the Underlying 
Action, we must determine whether the amount in 
controversy exceeded $75,000 before the settlement made 
clear the value of Hymed’s underlying claims. 
 
 In its amended complaint, Auto-Owners alleged that 
the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.  Typically, 
“[s]uch a general allegation when not traversed is sufficient, 
unless it is qualified by others which so detract from it that 
the court must dismiss sua sponte or on defendants’ motion.”  
13 
 
Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 72 (1939).  Auto-Owners based 
its allegation on averments in the then-pending Underlying 
Action,9 which claimed that Stevens & Ricci had violated the 
TCPA, that statutory damages were $500 per violation, and 
that “more than 39 other recipients” had received the faxes 
without their permission.  (J.A. at 545.)  Thus, at a minimum, 
Auto-Owners’s potential financial exposure when it filed its 
amended complaint was $20,000, i.e., $500 statutory damages 
for each of 40 fax recipients.  But the complaint in the 
Underlying Action also noted that damages could be trebled, 
further increasing that minimum to $60,000.  Again, that sum 
represents the minimum exposure, given trebling, and the 
complaint in the Underlying Action specifically noted that 
“more than 39” other individuals received the disputed faxes, 
with no limitation.  (J.A. at 545 (emphasis added).)  Using the 
statutory measure of damages and considering the potential 
for trebling, only eleven additional faxes would be necessary 
for damages to exceed $75,000.10  Importantly, the $60,000 
                                              
 9 In assessing whether the amended complaint 
sufficiently alleged jurisdiction, we may also consider 
“documents referenced therein and attached thereto.”  Gould 
Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000).  
Here, that includes Hymed’s complaint in the Underlying 
Action, as the amended complaint in the instant case 
repeatedly relies upon Hymed’s own allegations. 
 
 10 As it turned out, thousands of unsolicited faxes had 
been sent to a like number of recipients, so that the actual 
amount of the purported damages at the time the complaint 
was filed was plainly adequate, even if not known at the time.  
See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Powell, 87 F.3d 93, 97 
(3d Cir. 1996) (distinguishing between subsequent events that 
14 
 
minimum does not include the expense Auto-Owners would 
certainly incur in providing a legal defense against Hymed’s 
class action, as the Policy imposes on Auto-Owners a “duty to 
defend” its insured.  (J.A. at 563.)  That cost of defense in the 
Underlying Action, which can fairly be assumed to be well in 
excess of the $15,000 difference between $60,000 and the 
$75,000 jurisdictional threshold, is properly included in 
determining the amount in controversy here.  See State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Powell, 87 F.3d 93, 98 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(“[W]here the underlying instrument or contract itself 
provides for their payment, costs and attorneys’ fees must be 
considered in determining the jurisdictional amount” (internal 
quotation marks omitted).).11 
                                                                                                     
change the amount in controversy and subsequent revelations 
that clarify whether the amount in controversy was in fact met 
at the time the action was filed, and permitting the latter to be 
considered for assessing the “factual reality” underlying 
jurisdiction). 
 
 11 Attorney’s fees do not generally constitute part of 
the amount in controversy because the successful party 
typically does not collect its attorney’s fees.  As an exception 
to that rule, however, courts include attorney’s fees in the 
amount-in-controversy calculation when, as in this case, their 
payment is provided for by the terms of an underlying 
contract.  See 14AA Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal 
Practice & Procedure § 3712 (4th ed. 2016) (“[T]he amount 
expended for attorney’s fees are a part of the matter in 
controversy for subject matter jurisdiction purposes when 
they are provided for by contract … , since these are part of 
the liability being enforced. … The same is true when the 
action is for indemnification for a prior judgment plus the 
15 
 
 We have previously recognized that “the amount in 
controversy is not measured by the low end of an open-ended 
claim, but rather by a reasonable reading of the value of the 
rights being litigated.”  Angus v. Shiley Inc., 989 F.2d 142, 
146 (3d Cir. 1993).  Here, in light of the costs that Auto-
Owners would incur if required to defend the Underlying 
Action and the plausibility of there being a few additional fax 
recipients, we cannot say to a legal certainty that Auto-
                                                                                                     
attorney’s fees incurred in defending the earlier action.”); 
Springstead v. Crawfordsville State Bank, 231 U.S. 541, 541-
42 (1913) (“Could such an attorney’s fee be considered in 
determining whether the jurisdictional amount was involved?  
We think so. … [T]he moment suit was brought the liability 
to pay the fee became a ‘matter in controversy,’ and as such 
to be computed in making up the required jurisdictional 
amount … .”); see also Farmers Ins. Co. v. McClain, 603 
F.2d 821, 823 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding that an insurer’s 
potential losses for amount-in-controversy purposes can 
include the cost of its defense of its insured in an underlying 
suit); Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 544 F.2d 198, 199 (5th Cir. 
1976) (per curiam) (“The pecuniary value of the obligation to 
defend the separate lawsuit is properly considered in 
determining the existence of the jurisdictional amount … .”).  
Here, Auto-Owners seeks a declaration of its rights under an 
insurance policy that provides for both indemnification and 
defense.  Thus, at the time Auto-Owners filed this declaratory 
judgment case, its possible losses were not limited only to the 
value of any potential judgment that might have arisen out of 
the Underlying Action.  Those losses also included the costs it 
would incur if required to represent Stevens & Ricci in that 
case. 
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Owners’s declaratory judgment action was valued at or below 
$75,000 when it was filed.  We likewise cannot conclude that 
the complaint’s allegation that the amount in controversy 
exceeded $75,000 was made in bad faith. 
 
 Consistent with that conclusion, Hymed does not argue 
that Auto-Owners claimed more than $75,000 in bad faith.12  
Instead, it contends that, by adding up the potential damages 
owed to each of the various class members, Auto-Owners is 
improperly aggregating those claims to cross the 
jurisdictional threshold.  Again, the “claims of several 
plaintiffs, if they are separate and distinct, cannot be 
aggregated for purposes of determining the amount in 
controversy.”  Werwinski, 286 F.3d at 666 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).13  Although declaratory judgment actions do 
not directly involve the award of monetary damages, “it is 
well established that the amount in controversy [in such 
                                              
 12 It would be awkward for Hymed to even imply there 
was less than good faith, given that, in both of the declaratory 
judgment actions it filed in Michigan federal courts, see supra 
note 4, it had itself invoked federal diversity jurisdiction and 
alleged that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. 
 
 13 The Supreme Court has recognized one limitation on 
the anti-aggregation rule, which is inapplicable here.  See 
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 
(2005) (holding that the supplemental jurisdiction statute 
permits the exercise of diversity jurisdiction over additional 
plaintiffs who fail to satisfy the minimum amount-in-
controversy requirement, as long as the other elements of 
diversity jurisdiction are present and at least one named 
plaintiff does satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement). 
17 
 
actions] is measured by the value of the object of the 
litigation.”  Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 
U.S. 333, 347 (1977); see also 14AA Charles Alan Wright et 
al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3708 (4th ed. 2016) 
(“With regard to actions seeking declaratory relief, the 
amount in controversy is the value of the right or the viability 
of the legal claim to be declared, such as a right to 
indemnification or a duty to defend.”). 
 
 Hymed argues that the “object of the litigation” here is 
resolution of a dispute between the many members of the 
class and the insurer, and that Auto-Owners can thus only 
satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement by improperly 
aggregating those various claims.  To Hymed, “this action 
always has been a multi-party dispute between Auto-Owners 
and the multiplicity of class claimants.”  (Hymed Jan. 8, 2016 
Letter Br. at 9.)  Unsurprisingly, Auto-Owners disagrees, 
viewing the case as a unitary controversy between it and its 
insured.  Taking that perspective, Auto-Owners argues that, 
“in coverage litigation commenced by an insurer, the focus is 
on the amount the insurer will owe to its insured or the value 
of its coverage obligation.”  (Auto-Owners Jan. 4, 2016 Letter 
Br. at 1.)  Given those two competing positions, we must 
decide whether this case is properly viewed as a dispute 
between Auto-Owners and the many class members – which 
would give rise to aggregation problems – or as a dispute 
between Auto-Owners and its insured concerning its overall 
obligation to defend and indemnify under the Policy. 
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 Although we have never before spoken precedentially 
on this question,14 we find persuasive the opinion of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 
Meridian Security Insurance Company v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 
536 (7th Cir. 2006) (Easterbrook, J.).  There, much like here, 
an insurer sought a declaratory judgment against its insured to 
avoid any obligation to defend a class action alleging that the 
insured had sent unsolicited fax advertisements in violation of 
the TCPA.  Id. at 537.  Also as here, the underlying class 
action was still pending at the time the declaratory judgment 
action was filed.  Id. at 538.  In concluding that the district 
court indeed had diversity jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit 
rejected the very argument that Hymed now advances.  
According to that court, “[the insurer] has not aggregated 
multiple parties’ claims.  From its perspective there is only 
one claim – by its insured, for the sum of defense and 
indemnity costs.”  Id. at 539.  The Seventh Circuit thus held 
that “the anti-aggregation rule does not apply … just because 
the unitary controversy between these parties reflects the sum 
of many smaller controversies.  No more need be said on this 
subject.”  Id. 15 
                                              
 14 We have previously concluded, in a pair of non-
precedential opinions, that the district court does have 
jurisdiction under such circumstances, though we did not 
address the amount-in-controversy requirement in any detail.  
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. David Randall Assocs., Inc., 551 
F. App’x 638, 639 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014); St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co. v. Brother Int’l Corp., 319 F. App’x 121, 124 (3d 
Cir. 2009). 
 
 15 Each case that Hymed cites to the contrary is readily 
distinguishable.  It primarily relies on two cases – Siding & 
19 
 
                                                                                                     
Insulation Co. v. Acuity Mut. Ins. Co., 754 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. 
2014), and Travelers Prop. Cas. v. Good, 689 F.3d 714 (7th 
Cir. 2012).  Although Siding also involved class claims 
against an insured based on the TCPA, the declaratory 
judgment action in that case was commenced by a class 
representative, not the insurer, and that action did not include 
the insured.  754 F.3d at 368.  The Sixth Circuit, looking at 
the case from the perspective of the plaintiff class 
representative, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, 
holding that the only way the class members could meet their 
amount-in-controversy burden was by aggregating their 
claims.  Id. at 371-72.  Here, Auto-Owners commenced the 
declaratory judgment action.  Following the logic of Siding 
and taking the case from the perspective of the plaintiff – 
here, the insurer rather than the class – the amount in 
controversy is properly regarded as the entire sum Auto-
Owners could owe under the Policy. 
 At first glance, Good more closely resembles the 
present suit.  The insurer in that case filed the declaratory 
judgment action against its insured, but did so only after the 
settlement of the underlying class action for $16 million.  
Good, 689 F.3d at 716-17.  That settlement agreement 
assigned to the class members all of the insured’s claims 
against and rights to payment from the insurer.  Id. at 716.  As 
a result, the indemnity rights that the insurer was litigating 
had been functionally parceled by the terms of the settlement, 
thus requiring the court to aggregate the insurer’s obligation 
to each member of the class to reach the jurisdictional 
minimum.  The Seventh Circuit declined to do so.  And 
because it had previously issued Sadowski, the court 
distinguished that prior case on the very grounds we also now 
rely upon: 
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The decisive difference between this case and 
[Sadowski] is that at the time the insurer filed 
the declaratory judgment action in that case, the 
insured’s arguable right to recover under its 
policy was still completely its own.  No 
assignment had been made.  By the time [the 
insurer] filed this action, however, [the insured] 
had already assigned its claims to the members 
of the Good class, and no individual class 
member had a claim for more than $75,000. … 
Once [the insured] made the assignment of 
rights, this was no longer a “unitary 
controversy” between the insurer and its 
insured.  It had become a multi-party dispute 
between [the insurer] and thousands of class 
claimants.  [Sadowski] is inapposite. 
Id. at 718.  Here, as in Sadowski, Stevens & Ricci’s right to 
recovery had not been divided among the class members at 
the time the declaratory judgment complaint was filed.  The 
subsequent settlement in the Underlying Action did not 
revoke the jurisdiction that had been established. 
 We recognize that this results in a situation in which 
an insurer can invoke federal jurisdiction in a declaratory 
judgment action while class members cannot.  Echoing that 
notion, the Dissent says we are taking an “insurance-company 
viewpoint approach” to the amount-in-controversy question.  
(Dissent Op. at 10.)  But our decision reflects no partiality.  
The fact that Auto-Owners can invoke federal jurisdiction 
simply follows from application of the amount-in-controversy 
requirement and its accompanying anti-aggregation rule.  To 
Auto-Owners, the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000; 
we need not aggregate claims to cross that threshold.  To each 
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 We agree and now adopt Sadowski’s reasoning as our 
own.  Viewing this case from the perspective of the insurer at 
the time of filing of the declaratory judgment complaint, 
Auto-Owners’s quarrel was with Stevens & Ricci regarding 
its indemnity obligation under the Policy.  The only “amount 
in controversy” that the insurer was then concerned with was 
its total indemnity and defense obligation; it presumably had 
no interest in the way the indemnity sum might later be 
divided among the various class members.  Its dispute was 
thus with its insured, not the class.  And its overall liability 
(as established above) was not legally certain to fall below the 
jurisdictional minimum. 
 
                                                                                                     
member of the class, the amount in controversy falls short.  
Only one party may invoke our diversity jurisdiction because 
only that party has the requisite amount at stake.  We note, 
however, that any concern about one-sidedness should be 
mitigated by the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d), which vests district courts with jurisdiction 
over class actions where the aggregate amount in controversy 
exceeds $5,000,000 and the parties are minimally diverse.  As 
a consequence, class action plaintiffs may satisfy the amount-
in-controversy requirement necessary for federal jurisdiction 
if their individual claims exceed $75,000 or if the total 
aggregate claims of the class exceed $5,000,000.  Here, the 
aggregate statutory damages of the class, as subsequent 
revelations have made clear, see supra note 10, perhaps 
exceeded the CAFA threshold.  In future cases, if class 
members cannot satisfy either amount, they are not then 
entirely without any opportunity for declaratory relief; they 
just need to proceed in state court. 
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 Our dissenting colleague disagrees, and would dismiss 
this case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  He first 
points out that “Hymed, not Stevens & Ricci, Inc., has been 
defending the suit from the beginning,” and “Stevens & Ricci 
has not so much as entered an appearance in the matter.”  
(Dissent Op. at 1-2.)  But that is not something we may 
consider, because – as already noted – “federal diversity 
jurisdiction is generally determined based on the 
circumstances prevailing at the time the suit was filed.”  
Kaufman, 561 F.3d at 152.  Auto-Owners filed this 
declaratory judgment action against both Stevens & Ricci and 
Hymed at a time when the Underlying Action was still 
pending.  The fact that only Hymed is now defending this 
case does not alter the circumstances that existed at the time it 
was filed. 
 
 Next, the Dissent says there is tension between our 
standing jurisprudence, “in which we have stressed that 
parties like Hymed have a significant stake” in insurance 
coverage actions, and our amount-in-controversy conclusion 
that “parties like Hymed cannot assert federal jurisdiction in 
declaratory actions seeking similar relief.”  (Dissent Op. at 2.)  
There is no such tension.  Standing and amount-in-
controversy are two distinct inquiries.  Hymed certainly had 
standing to participate in this insurance coverage action, see 
supra note 7, but that does not alter the $75,000 amount-in-
controversy threshold that it must meet in order for the 
dispute to fall within our jurisdiction. 
 
 The Dissent then cites In re Ford Motor Co./Citibank 
(South Dakota), N.A., 264 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2001) for 
the proposition that we should look directly “to Hymed’s 
underlying suit to determine the amount in controversy.”  
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(Dissent Op. at 6.)  But Ford involved multiple plaintiffs who 
each sought injunctive relief.  264 F.3d at 955-56.  In 
dismissing that case, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit took the same plaintiff-focused approach 
that we now take and held that the amount at stake “depend[s] 
upon the nature and value of the right asserted” by each 
plaintiff.  Id. at 959.  Our approach here is thus entirely 
consistent with Ford.16  The Dissent nonetheless labors to 
create an aggregation problem.  Indeed, its approach to 
determining the amount in controversy in declaratory 
judgment cases – to effectively ignore the declaratory 
judgment action altogether and look only at the Underlying 
Action – is unprecedented.17  We must look to the Underlying 
                                              
 16 Despite the Dissent’s charge to the contrary, our 
approach is also consistent with our opinion in Packard v. 
Provident National Bank, 994 F.2d 1039 (3d Cir. 1993).  
Packard involved a claim by various class members against a 
bank, and the parties sought to avoid aggregation problems by 
arguing that the jurisdictional amount should be measured by 
the costs to the bank rather than the damages of each plaintiff.  
994 F.2d at 1050.  We held that permitting that method of 
measurement would create aggregation problems.  Id.  But 
that is not what happened here.  In this case, Auto-Owners 
filed suit against its one insured and Hymed.  Were the case 
reversed, Packard might prove relevant.  As it stands, the 
plaintiff in the declaratory judgment action (Auto-Owners) is 
not aggregating claims to meet the amount-in-controversy 
requirement. 
 
 17 Our dissenting colleague takes issue with this 
characterization but cites no cases that have ever taken his 
view. 
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Action to discern the value of the right being litigated here, 
but we cannot, and do not, ignore party status when 
determining whether the plaintiff in the case before us is 
improperly aggregating claims to reach the jurisdictional 
threshold.  From Auto-Owners’s perspective, the basic 
dispute is one between it and its insured over the scope of 
overall insurance coverage.  Principles of anti-aggregation 
thus remain intact. 
 
 The Dissent goes on to change tack, arguing that “the 
total amount potentially owed by Auto-Owners [in the 
Underlying Action] also falls short of the $75,000 threshold.”  
(Dissent Op. at 6.)  On that score, we simply disagree.  It is 
difficult for us to say to a legal certainty that less than 
$75,000 is at stake in this case, where damages from the faxes 
alone were known to be at least $60,000, the complaint 
specifically said that more individuals received the faxes in 
question, and only eleven additional faxes would be necessary 
to cross the jurisdictional threshold.  In apparent recognition 
of those facts, neither party has even raised this argument.  
And, of course, subsequent revelations show that, at the time 
of the complaint, over 18,000 faxes had actually been sent, 
placing a great deal more than $75,000 at issue.  See Powell, 
87 F.3d at 97; supra note 10.  In any event, we are attuned to 
the admonition that “the amount in controversy is not 
measured by the low end of an open-ended claim, but rather 
by a reasonable reading of the value of the rights being 
litigated.”  Angus v. Shiley Inc., 989 F.2d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 
1993).  The Supreme Court has likewise instructed that we 
may only dismiss if it appears “to a legal certainty that the 
claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.”  St. 
Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 303 U.S. at 288-89.  We do not 
share our dissenting colleague’s certainty. 
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 Finally, the Dissent would not take into account 
potential attorney’s fees when determining the amount in 
controversy here, and faults us for an “unnecessary expansion 
of our jurisprudence” on the subject.  (Dissent Op. at 8-9.)  
Even if we were to set attorney’s fees aside entirely, that 
would not change our conclusion that the amount in 
controversy exceeds $75,000, for the reasons just set forth.  
But we ought not discount those costs.  As we have 
endeavored to explain, supra note 11, Auto-Owners is 
seeking a declaration of its rights and responsibilities with 
respect to a contract that requires it to pay its insured’s 
defense costs.  Our precedent on the subject is 
straightforward: “costs and attorneys’ fees should be 
considered part of the amount in controversy for jurisdictional 
purposes when they are mandated by underlying instruments 
or contracts.”  Powell, 87 F.3d at 98.18  Here, the underlying 
                                              
 18 Our dissenting colleague says we are “tak[ing] 
Powell out of context,” and uses a block quotation from that 
case to shed light on its reasoning.  (Dissent Op. at 7.)  One 
could read that block quote, as the Dissent does, as expressing 
some doubt about the rule of law discussed in the case.  But 
that is not so.  Powell recognized the common-sense notion 
that if the payment of attorney’s fees is provided for by an 
underlying contract, then those fees should be considered for 
amount-in-controversy purposes.  87 F.3d at 98.  The 
prevailing party will be awarded those fees, so they are quite 
clearly “in controversy.”  In support of that proposition, the 
Powell Court cited the same two cases, Springstead and 
McClain, which we have also cited.  See Powell, 87 F.3d at 
98; supra note 11.  Until today, there was no debate about 
that rule.  Indeed, after collecting some thirty cases to that 
effect, a leading treatise describes the law on this question as 
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insurance contract mandates that Auto-Owners pay its 
insured’s defense costs, including fees.  As the Dissent points 
out, Auto-Owners’s duty to defend Steven & Ricci “only 
applies to suits that fall within coverage.”  (Dissent Op. at 7.)  
That is exactly right, which means that the obligation to pay 
attorney’s fees rises and falls with the outcome of this 
coverage dispute.  That obligation is thus an inseparable part 
of the “amount in controversy” between Auto-Owners and 
Stevens & Ricci.  To ignore those costs is to ignore the reality 
of what is at stake in this litigation. 
                                                                                                     
“now quite settled.”  14AA Charles Alan Wright et al., 
Federal Practice & Procedure § 3712 (4th ed. 2016). 
 The problem we identified in Powell was that a 
previous district court opinion on which a party to the case 
had relied – Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rowles, 818 F. Supp. 
852 (E.D. Pa. 1993) – had used that correct rule of law and 
applied it in an improper context.  In Rowles, the arbitration 
provision in the underlying contract provided that the costs of 
arbitration would be shared evenly by the parties.  Powell, 87 
F.3d at 98.  Thus, the amount was not “in controversy” at all; 
it would be borne equally regardless of the outcome of the 
arbitration or litigation.  So, when Powell “question[ed] the 
reasoning of the district court’s decision in Rowles,” 87 F.3d 
at 98, it did not call into doubt a settled rule of law.  Instead, 
the Powell Court took issue with whether Rowles had 
correctly applied that rule of law to the case at hand – a case 
in which the underlying contract did not make the payment of 
fees depend upon the outcome of the litigation.  Here, by 
contrast, the insurance coverage dispute also resolves the fee 
payment dispute; if the claim is covered, then Auto-Owners 
will pay the fees, and vice-versa.  The present case thus fits 
easily into the settled rule the Powell Court discussed. 
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 Accordingly, satisfaction of the amount-in-controversy 
requirement in this case does not violate the anti-aggregation 
rule, and the District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1332. 
 
 B. Standard of Review 
 
 Both parties moved for summary judgment under Rule 
56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Summary 
judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all 
inferences in favor of that party, there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Appelmans v. City of 
Phila., 826 F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1987).  “This standard does 
not change when the issue is presented in the context of cross-
motions for summary judgment.”  Appelmans, 826 F.2d at 
216.  When both parties move for summary judgment, “[t]he 
court must rule on each party’s motion on an individual and 
separate basis, determining, for each side, whether a judgment 
may be entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard.”  
10A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & 
Procedure § 2720 (3d ed. 2016).  On appeal, “[w]e exercise 
plenary review over an order resolving cross-motions for 
summary judgment,” Tristani ex rel. Karnes v. Richman, 652 
F.3d 360, 366 (3d Cir. 2011), applying the same standard that 
the lower court was obligated to apply under Rule 56, 
Smathers v. Multi-Tool, Inc., 298 F.3d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 
2002). 
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 C. Analysis 
 
 A federal court sitting in diversity must apply state 
substantive law.  Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 
158 (3d Cir. 2000).  Here, the ultimate merits question is 
whether the sending of faxes in the described circumstances 
fell under the Policy’s definition of either “property damage” 
or “advertising injury,” as a matter of state law.19  But before 
reaching that question, we must determine which state’s law 
to apply.  The parties disagree on that point.  Auto-Owners 
urges Pennsylvania law, given Pennsylvania’s role as the 
forum state for both this declaratory judgment case and the 
Underlying Action.  Hymed, on the other hand, says that 
Arizona law should apply.  It emphasizes the many 
connections between the Policy and that state: Stevens & 
Ricci is based and incorporated there; the underwriting file on 
                                              
 19 Hymed makes no argument concerning the scope of 
Auto-Owners’s duty to defend Stevens & Ricci, as distinct 
from its duty to indemnify.  Hymed argues only that Auto-
Owners must indemnify its insured per the Policy, and thus 
pay the $2,000,000 settlement.  Subject to the terms of the 
insurance policy, an insurer’s duty to defend may be broader 
than its duty to indemnify.  Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner 
U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 888, 896 
n.7 (Pa. 2006).  But we need not consider the extent of Auto-
Owners’s duty to defend its insured given the absence of any 
argument on this issue.  Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 113 
n.3 (3d Cir. 2007) (“An issue that is not discussed in the 
briefs is waived.”).  We thus address only the scope of Auto-
Owners’s duty to indemnify under the Policy – that is, its 
obligation to pay the $2,000,000 judgment. 
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the Policy indicates that the insurance quote was by an 
agency based in Tucson; the application for insurance was 
submitted to the Auto-Owners branch in Mesa and reviewed 
by an underwriter there; and the decision to insure Stevens & 
Ricci was made entirely within the Mesa branch.  Essentially, 
Hymed argues that Arizona law should apply because that is 
where the insurance contract was formed.20 
 
 Because the Policy itself did not contain a choice-of-
law provision, to determine which state’s substantive law 
applies we “must apply the choice of law rules of the forum 
state.”  Kruzits v. Okuma Mach. Tool, Inc., 40 F.3d 52, 55 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 
U.S. 487, 497 (1941)).  As in all applications of state law, our 
task “is to predict how the [state] Supreme Court would rule 
if it were deciding this case.”  Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Basell 
USA Inc., 512 F.3d 86, 91-92 (3d Cir. 2008).  This action was 
filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, so we apply 
Pennsylvania choice-of-law rules.  In contract cases, those 
rules are not entirely settled.  Before 1964, Pennsylvania 
courts applied the law of the place where the contract was 
formed (“lex loci contractus”).  That stood in contrast to the 
rule in tort cases, which required application of the law of the 
place where the injury occurred (“lex loci delicti”).  In 
Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court abandoned the “lex loci delicti” rule for torts “in favor 
of a more flexible rule which permits analysis of the policies 
                                              
 20 Neither party has argued in favor of applying the law 
of Michigan, the state where Auto-Owners is based and 
where Hymed previously filed two declaratory judgment 
actions of its own, see supra note 4.  We therefore do not 
consider Michigan in our choice-of-law analysis. 
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and interests underlying the particular issue before the court.”  
203 A.2d 796, 805 (Pa. 1964).  The Griffith court did not 
address whether its new flexible approach to choice-of-law 
questions would also apply to contract claims, thus also 
displacing the “lex loci contractus” rule.  Nor, in the years 
since, has the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had occasion to 
answer that question. 
 
 But we have, twice.  Almost 40 years ago, we 
“predict[ed] that Pennsylvania w[ould] extend its Griffith 
methodology to contract actions.”  Melville v. Am. Home 
Assurance Co., 584 F.2d 1306, 1312 (3d Cir. 1978).  More 
recently, in Hammersmith v. TIG Insurance Co., we 
thoroughly analyzed subsequent precedent and again 
concluded that Pennsylvania would apply Griffith’s flexible 
approach to choice-of-law questions in contract cases.  480 
F.3d 220, 226-29 (3d Cir. 2007).  In particular, we 
emphasized that, in Budtel Associates, LP v. Continental 
Casualty Company, the Pennsylvania Superior Court had 
concluded “[a]fter careful reflection” that the “spirit and 
weight of th[e] Commonwealth’s precedents mandate we 
follow the Griffith rule in the contract law context.”  Id. at 
228 (quoting Budtel Assocs., LP v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 915 A.2d 
640, 644 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006)).  Although Hymed argues that 
the previous “lex loci contractus” rule should control – and 
thus we should apply Arizona law – it cites no intervening 
Pennsylvania authority that calls our prediction in 
Hammersmith into question.  Accordingly, we will continue 
to follow our previous prediction and apply Griffith’s flexible 
choice-of-law analysis. 
 
 Under the Griffith approach, “the first step in a choice 
of law analysis under Pennsylvania law is to determine 
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whether a conflict exists between the laws of the competing 
states.”  Budtel Assocs., 915 A.2d at 643.  If there are no 
relevant differences between the laws of the two states, the 
court need not engage in further choice-of-law analysis, and 
may instead refer to the states’ laws interchangeably.  
Hammersmith, 480 F.3d at 229-30.  To determine whether a 
conflict exists, we must decide whether Arizona and 
Pennsylvania law disagree on the proper scope of the 
coverage applicable here. 
 
 Hymed cites “two significant conflicts” between 
Arizona and Pennsylvania substantive law.  (Opening Br. at 
17.)  First, it contends that a basic Pennsylvania principle of 
contract interpretation – that courts enforce unambiguous 
policy language – does not apply to the interpretation of 
insurance contracts under Arizona law.  Instead, as Hymed’s 
argument goes, Arizona courts interpret insurance contracts 
by looking to the “reasonable expectations of the insured.”  
(Id. at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).)  According to 
Hymed, “in Arizona, even clear and unambiguous boilerplate 
language is ineffective if it contravenes the insured’s 
reasonable expectations.”  (Id.) 
 
 We reject that argument.  To begin with, we do not 
agree that there is a conflict; both states, with limited 
exceptions not applicable here, give dispositive weight to 
clear and unambiguous insurance contract language.21  But, 
                                              
 21 Pennsylvania and Arizona generally apply clear and 
unambiguous language in an insurance contract.  See Erie Ins. 
Exch. v. Conley, 29 A.3d 389, 392 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011); 
D.M.A.F.B. Fed. Credit Union v. Emp’rs Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. 
of Wis., 396 P.2d 20, 23 (Ariz. 1964).  Indeed, both states 
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recognize that the written policy itself manifests the intention 
of the parties.  See Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. 
Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106 (Pa. 1999); Fireman’s Fund Ins. 
Co. v. New Zealand Ins. Co., 439 P.2d 1020, 1021 (Ariz. 
1968).  As a narrow exception, Arizona does rely on the 
reasonable expectations of the parties to refuse enforcement 
of “even unambiguous boilerplate terms in standardized 
insurance contracts,” but only in a “limited variety of 
situations.”  Gordinier v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 742 P.2d 
277, 283 (Ariz. 1987) (emphasis in original).  Those limited 
situations involve either unambiguous language that is not 
sufficiently understandable to a reasonably-intelligent 
consumer, unusual terms that emasculate apparent coverage, 
or situations where the insurer’s previous conduct created a 
mistaken impression of coverage despite clear language to the 
contrary.  Id. at 283-84.  That exception, contrary to Hymed’s 
argument, is in line with Pennsylvania law, which also 
recognizes and protects the reasonable expectations of the 
insured “regardless of the ambiguity, or lack thereof, inherent 
in a given set of insurance documents” where policy terms 
may not be readily understandable, Collister v. Nationwide 
Life Ins. Co., 388 A.2d 1346, 1353 (Pa. 1978), or to protect 
the insured from deception or unilateral changes to policy 
terms by the insurer, Tonkovic v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 521 A.2d 920, 925-26 (Pa. 1987). 
 That narrow exception is irrelevant here, however, as 
Hymed makes no argument that this case falls into any of 
those categories.  Instead, Hymed seems to suggest that 
Arizona’s law concerning insurance contract interpretation 
simply traces the expectations of the insured, and Arizona 
courts conclude that an insured has coverage if it reasonably 
thinks it has coverage.  (See Reply Br. at 11 n.2 (arguing that, 
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even if a conflict existed on that broad interpretive principle, 
Hymed makes no effort to detail how or why the use of the 
“reasonable expectation” test would give rise to a relevant 
conflict in the substantive law applicable here.  As best we 
can tell, Hymed is using the “reasonable expectation” test to 
empower it to conduct a fifty-state legal survey and to 
advocate that Arizona’s law must be whatever the prevailing 
legal theory is across the country since that prevailing law is – 
given its popularity – inherently “reasonable.”  In Hymed’s 
words, “to suggest that its proffered policy interpretation is 
consistent with a reasonable insured’s expectations, Auto-
Owners must demonstrate that the interpretation adopted 
explicitly or implicitly by courts nationwide is unreasonable.”  
(Opening Br. at 18.)  That argument misperceives the nature 
of our inquiry.  When sitting in diversity and conducting a 
choice-of-law analysis pursuant to Pennsylvania conflict 
principles, our job is only to evaluate any conflict between the 
laws of Arizona and Pennsylvania.  In its first purported 
“conflict,” Hymed makes no argument that those two states’ 
laws are different in any way that actually changes the 
meaning of either of the relevant terms of the Policy: 
“property damage” or “advertising injury.”  Its argument is 
thus not only wrong on the law – the states’ laws do not 
conflict in how they interpret insurance contracts – but is also 
irrelevant because Hymed fails to connect the purported 
conflict to the law we must apply in this case. 
 
                                                                                                     
under Arizona law, “the reasonable expectation of the insured 
is controlling” (original emphasis)).)  That would allow the 
exception to swallow the rule, would be oddly one-sided, and 
is not the law of Arizona. 
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 Hymed’s second alleged conflict is more tenable and 
relates to differing interpretations of Arizona and 
Pennsylvania courts as to the meaning of “property damage.”  
The Policy requires that any covered “property damage” be 
caused by an “occurrence” (J.A. at 563), which is defined as 
an “accident” (J.A. at 575).  The Policy does not define the 
term “accident,” though it does separately exclude from 
coverage any property damage “expected or intended from 
the standpoint of the insured.”  (J.A. at 565.)  Hymed 
contends that the two states define an “accident” differently.  
Specifically, it says that the two states’ laws are in conflict 
over whether an insurance policy that covers “accidents” 
would extend to the “unintended consequences of intentional 
acts,” in this instance, damage to a fax recipient from an 
intentionally-sent fax.  (Opening Br. at 19.) 
 
 Hymed argues that “a construction of Pennsylvania 
law” results in such damages being excluded from coverage.  
(Opening Br. at 19.)  We agree.  In Donegal Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Baumhammers, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania said that, when “accident” is undefined in an 
insurance policy, Pennsylvania courts should treat the term as 
“refer[ing] to an unexpected and undesirable event occurring 
unintentionally ….”  938 A.2d 286, 292 (Pa. 2007). 
 
[T]he key term in the definition of the 
“accident” is “unexpected” which implies a 
degree of fortuity.  An injury therefore is not 
“accidental” if the injury was the natural and 
expected result of the insured’s actions. … See 
also Minnesota Fire and Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 
855 A.2d 854, 870 (Pa. 2004) (“‘Accident’ has 
been defined in the context of insurance 
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contracts as an event or happening without 
human agency or, if happening through such 
agency, an event which, under circumstances, is 
unusual and not expected by the person to 
whom it happens.”) 
 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  That definition comports with 
the basic purpose of insurance: “to cover only fortuitous 
losses.”  United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Elitzky, 517 A.2d 982, 
986 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). 
 
 The intentional conduct of third parties may still be a 
covered “accident” under that definition.  By way of example, 
Baumhammers involved a killing spree perpetrated by the son 
of the insured.  938 A.2d at 288.  The estates of several of the 
victims sued both the son and his parents, alleging, among 
other claims, negligence on the part of the parents “in failing 
to take possession of [his] gun and/or alert law enforcement 
authorities or mental health care providers about [their son’s] 
dangerous propensities.”  Id. at 291.  The parents sought 
coverage under their insurance, which covered claims for 
bodily injury caused by an “accident.”  Id. at 288.  The 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that, with respect to the 
insured parents, the shootings qualified as an “accident” 
under the policy.  Id. at 293.  “The extraordinary shooting 
spree embarked upon by [the son] resulting in injuries to [the 
victims] cannot be said to be the natural and expected result 
of [his parent’s] alleged acts of negligence.”  Id.  The 
“injuries were caused by an event so unexpected, undesigned 
and fortuitous as to qualify as accidental within the terms of 
the policy.”  Id. 
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 Here, in contrast, Hymed’s claimed injury is the use of 
ink, toner, and time that was caused by the receipt of junk 
faxes.  Those injuries are the natural and expected result of 
the intentional sending of faxes, a far cry from Pennsylvania’s 
definition of an “accident.”  Though it did not intend injury, 
Stevens & Ricci clearly intended for the third-party advertiser 
to send the fax advertisements to the members of the class.  
Barring a problem with the communication devices, the 
sending of faxes necessarily results in the receipt of faxes, 
and any sender of a fax knows that its recipient will need to 
consume paper and toner and will temporarily lose the use of 
its fax line.  That does not happen by accident.  While the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has not addressed whether 
unintended damages from faxes sent in violation of the TCPA 
constitute an “accident,” we predict that the court would 
reject coverage under the “property damage” provision of the 
Policy.22 
 
 In its effort to manufacture a conflict, Hymed next 
claims that Arizona law would cover its claim as an 
“accident.”  Unfortunately for Hymed, Arizona law defines 
an “accident” much the same way as does Pennsylvania law: 
                                              
 22 In reaching that conclusion, we are guided and 
persuaded by the extensive analysis of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which 
applied Pennsylvania law in the closely analogous case of 
Melrose Hotel Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 
432 F. Supp. 2d 488 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (rejecting coverage 
under “accident” provision of insurance policy when a third-
party vendor sent unsolicited fax advertisements in violation 
of the TCPA), aff’d, 503 F.3d 339 (3d Cir. 2007) (judgment 
order). 
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[A]n effect which was or should have been 
reasonably anticipated by an insured person to 
be the natural or probable result of his own 
voluntary acts is not accidental.  Or to put it in 
the affirmative form, if the result is one which 
in the ordinary course of affairs would not be 
anticipated by a reasonable person to flow from 
his own acts, it is accidental.  The test is, what 
effect should the insured, as a reasonable man, 
expect from his own actions under the 
circumstances. 
 
Cal. State Life Ins. Co. v. Fuqua, 10 P.2d 958, 960 (Ariz. 
1932); see Lennar Corp. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 151 P.3d 
538, 547 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (“Whether an event is 
accidental is evaluated from the perspective of the insured. … 
[A]n accident is anything that happens or is the result of that 
which is unanticipated and takes place without the insured’s 
foresight or expectation or intention.” (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  Following that definition, as a 
matter of Arizona law just as under Pennsylvania law, the use 
of ink, toner, and time can be regarded as the natural result of 
the intentional sending of faxes.23 
                                              
 23 Hymed primarily relies on two cases in its effort to 
demonstrate that the unintentional damage from the sending 
of the faxes is covered by the Policy as interpreted under 
Arizona law – Transamerica Insurance Group v. Meere, 694 
P.2d 181 (Ariz. 1984), and Phoenix Control Systems, Inc. v. 
Insurance Co. of North America, 796 P.2d 463 (Ariz. 1990).  
The question in Transamerica was whether an insurance 
contract that excluded intentional injury would cover 
damages inflicted by an insured acting in self-defense.  The 
38 
 
                                                                                                     
Supreme Court of Arizona held that, when an insured acts 
properly in self-defense, resulting injury will be covered 
because, although “[t]he law presumes he intended the result 
which was the natural consequence of his intentional act,” 
one acting in self-defense is “confronted with a risk over 
which he ha[s] little control.”  694 P.2d at 188-89.  The court 
thus relied partly on the underlying purpose of insurance: 
protecting “against risks that are outside [the insured’s] 
control.”  Id. at 185.  It would be inconsistent with that 
purpose to exclude coverage for an insured who is simply 
“attempting to avoid a ‘calamity’ which has befallen him.”  
Id. at 186.  But insurance is not meant to allow an insured to 
act wrongfully “with the security of knowing that his 
insurance company will ‘pay the piper’ for the damages.”  Id. 
 Similarly, Phoenix Control involved a situation in 
which the insured acted under a claim of right or justification.  
There, the insured intended to use copyrighted material, but 
did so under a belief “that he had the ‘legal right’ to use the 
information because it was in the public domain.”  796 P.2d 
at 468-69.  That belief “was based on advice of counsel.”  Id. 
at 469.  Following Transamerica, the Supreme Court of 
Arizona held that summary judgment in favor of the insurer 
was improper because the insured’s subjective intent in using 
the materials was a disputed fact.  Id. at 469-70.  In reaching 
that holding, the court noted that, “[b]efore a court may 
inquire into the insured’s subjective intent, the facts must 
indicate that the insured was provoked, privileged, or justified 
in acting.”  Id. at 468.  Contrary to Hymed’s argument, 
Transamerica and Phoenix Control do not require coverage 
for all insureds who merely assert that they did not intend the 
injury caused.  Where no “affirmative claim of [a] privilege” 
exists, Transamerica, 694 P.2d at 183, Arizona law demands 
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 We conclude that there is no conflict between 
Pennsylvania and Arizona law on the question of whether the 
damage to the class members is covered under the Policy’s 
definition of “property damage.”  Under either states’ law, 
there is no coverage because the alleged injury was not the 
result of an “accident.”  It was, instead, the foreseeable result 
of the intentional sending of faxes to the class recipients. 
 
 Finally, Hymed argues that coverage is available 
because the damage to class members from receipt of the junk 
faxes qualifies as “advertising injury” under the Policy.  
Because Hymed does not contend that the Arizona definition 
of “advertising injury” differs from that of Pennsylvania, we 
look to Pennsylvania law to answer that question.24  We again 
                                                                                                     
that an insured be held responsible for the foreseeable results 
of his or her actions.  Insurance coverage does not insulate an 
insured who “claim[s] that he did not intend the precise injury 
– in character or magnitude – that in fact occurred.”  Id. at 
189. 
 
 24 As previously discussed, Hymed relies on its 
misapprehension of Arizona law regarding the “reasonable 
expectations of the insured” exception as a way to survey the 
nationwide legal landscape and to argue that Arizona law has 
incorporated Hymed’s preferred definition of “advertising 
injury.”  Although Hymed cites law from a number of 
jurisdictions to support its argument that “advertising injury” 
coverage exists here, it omits any citations from one notable 
jurisdiction: Arizona.  Given the absence of any proper 
argument or even citation to Arizona law, we apply the law of 
Pennsylvania. 
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conclude, as did the District Court, that the claimed injury 
falls outside of the scope of the Policy’s coverage. 
 
 The Policy defines “advertising injury” as, among 
other things: “Oral or written publication of material that 
violates a person’s right of privacy.”  (J.A. at 573.)25  
Although the Policy does not define the term “privacy,” 
numerous state and federal courts have considered whether 
violations of the TCPA are covered by insurance policies that 
include similar or identical language to that at issue here.  Of 
particular note is the decision of the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court in Telecommunications Network Design v. Brethren 
Mutual Insurance Co. (“Brethren”), which collects cases that 
organize the covered “right of privacy” into two broad 
categories: the privacy interest in secrecy and the privacy 
interest in seclusion.  5 A.3d 331, 335-36 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2010).  Secrecy- based privacy rights protect private 
information, while seclusion-based privacy rights protect the 
right to be left alone.  The TCPA protects only the latter 
category of privacy interest, by shielding people from 
unsolicited messages.  The content of the messages (i.e., 
whether they include private information) is immaterial under 
the TCPA.  “Congress took aim at unsolicited advertisements, 
                                              
 25 The Policy also defines “advertising injury” as: 
“Oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels 
a person or organization or disparages a person’s or 
organization’s goods, products or services”; 
“Misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing 
business”; and “Infringement of copyright, title or slogan.”  
(J.A. at 573.)  Hymed does not argue that its damages fall 
under any of those three definitions, so we do not address 
them, except in the comparative way noted hereafter. 
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not the content of those advertisements.”  Melrose Hotel Co. 
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 432 F. Supp. 2d 488, 502 
(E.D. Pa. 2006), aff’d, 503 F.3d 339 (3d Cir. 2007) (judgment 
order).  The sending of unsolicited faxes does not necessarily 
result in the dissemination of confidential information.  
Rather, “an unsolicited fax intrudes upon the right to be free 
from nuisance.”  Id. at 501.  “Accordingly, the TCPA seeks to 
protect privacy interests in seclusion, not secrecy.”  Id.  That 
purpose is consistent with the type of injury that Hymed 
alleged in its complaint, saying, “[t]he [Stevens & Ricci] 
faxes unlawfully interrupted the … class members’ privacy 
interests in being left alone.”  (J.A. at 550.) 
 
 The Policy does not cover that injury.  Read in context, 
the Policy provides coverage only for violations of the 
privacy interest in secrecy, and thus does not cover violations 
of a right to seclusion.  This is amply demonstrated by the 
other three offenses that the Policy includes within the 
definition of “advertising injury”: “Oral or written publication 
of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or 
disparages a person’s or organization’s goods, products or 
services”; “Misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of 
doing business”; and “Infringement of copyright, title or 
slogan.”  (J.A. at 573.)  All three of those offenses – slander, 
misappropriation, and infringement – “focus on harm arising 
from the content of an advertisement rather than harm arising 
from mere receipt of an advertisement.”  Auto-Owners Ins. 
Co. v. Websolv Computing, Inc., 580 F.3d 543, 551 (7th Cir. 
2009) (interpreting an identical “advertising injury” provision 
to exclude coverage for the sending of unsolicited faxes).  
That content-dependent coverage clarifies the scope of the 
Policy’s “advertising injury” provision: it protects against 
injuries caused by the improper content of a published 
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advertisement.26  The Policy’s protection of the “right of 
privacy” is thus logically limited to a privacy interest the 
infringement of which depends upon the content of the 
advertisements: in other words, the privacy right to secrecy. 
 
 None of the allegations in the Underlying Action relate 
in any way to the content of the faxed advertisements.  The 
faxes caused the alleged damage because they were received 
without permission, not because of their content.  At no point 
did Hymed allege that those unsolicited faxes included 
confidential or otherwise secret information about any of the 
class members.  Because the Policy’s “advertising injury” 
deals only with the publication of private information, it 
strongly suggests that the injury alleged in the Underlying 
Action falls outside of the scope of that protection. 
 
 And what the provision’s context suggests its plain 
text confirms.  Again, as relevant here, the Policy defines 
“advertising injury” to include “[o]ral or written publication 
of material that violates a person’s right of privacy.”  (J.A. at 
573 (emphasis added).)  In that definition, the phrase “that 
violates a person’s right of privacy” modifies the term 
“material.”  See Pa. Dep’t of Banking v. NCAS of Del., LLC, 
                                              
 26 See Riccio v. Am. Republic Ins. Co., 705 A.2d 422, 
426 (Pa. 1997) (“[A]n insurance policy, like every other 
written contract, must be read in its entirety and the intent of 
the policy is gathered from consideration of the entire 
instrument.”); Northway Vill. No. 3, Inc. v. Northway Props., 
Inc., 244 A.2d 47, 50 (Pa. 1968) (“[T]he meaning of words 
may be indicated or controlled by those words with which 
they are associated.  Words are known by the company they 
keep.”). 
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948 A.2d 752, 760 (Pa. 2008) (“[T]he last antecedent rule … 
advises that a proviso usually is construed to apply only to the 
provision or clause immediately preceding it.”); Buntz v. Gen. 
Am. Life Ins. Co., 7 A.2d 93, 95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1939) 
(applying rule of the last antecedent to the interpretation of an 
insurance contract).27  Thus, it must be the “material” itself, 
rather than its “publication,” that violates a person’s right of 
privacy.  See ACS Sys., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 
Co., 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 786, 796 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) 
(construing analogous provision and concluding “that 
‘material’ is not only the last antecedent of ‘that’ but is also 
its only antecedent”).  That “would be the case only if the 
material contained confidential information and violated the 
victim’s right to secrecy.”  State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. JT’s 
Frames, Inc., 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 573, 586 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) 
(using the rule of the last antecedent to construe identically-
worded provision).  The text of the relevant provision of the 
Policy, as well as its broader context, thus compels a content-
dependent view of the privacy interest meant to be protected. 
 
 Of course, our ultimate endeavor is to apply 
Pennsylvania law to determine the scope of the Policy’s 
“advertising injury” provision.  Although the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania has not addressed that question, the Superior 
Court in Brethren interpreted verbatim contract language and 
reached the same conclusion as we do here, for largely the 
                                              
 27 We recognize that the rule of the last antecedent is 
“not an absolute and can assuredly be overcome by other 
indicia of meaning ... .”  Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 
(2003).  But here, those other indicia of meaning – the 
surrounding language already described – confirm the rule’s 
applicability rather than undermine it. 
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reasons we have addressed.  Brethren, 5 A.3d at 337.  We 
regard decisions of an intermediate appellate court as 
“indic[ative] of how the state’s highest court might decide the 
issue.”  McGowan v. Univ. of Scranton, 759 F.2d 287, 291 
(3d Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Such 
decisions can even constitute “presumptive evidence” of state 
law.  Nat’l Sur. Corp. v. Midland Bank, 551 F.2d 21, 30 (3d 
Cir. 1977).  We emphasize that this case raises the exact same 
question as did Brethren – the policy language is identical, 
the underlying TCPA violation is identical, and the claimed 
damages for that violation are identical.28  We thus defer to 
the intermediate appellate court’s decision as a well-reasoned 
interpretation of Pennsylvania state law.29 
                                              
 28 Brethren also represents a validation of the earlier 
prediction of state law made by the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania in Melrose Hotel, “which applied Pennsylvania 
policy interpretation rules to an insurance policy containing a 
nearly identical clause to that in the instant matter and 
concluded that there was no duty to defend.”  Brethren, 5 
A.3d at 336 (citing Melrose Hotel, 432 F. Supp. 2d 488). 
 
 29 Hymed argues that the Policy’s “advertising injury” 
definition “provides coverage for violations of all rights of 
privacy.”  (Opening Br. at 26.)  It does so by contrasting the 
Policy’s coverage for “publication of material that violates a 
person’s right of privacy” (J.A. at 573 (emphasis added)), 
with the “advertising injury” language in Melrose Hotel, 
which extended coverage to the act of “[m]aking known to 
any person or organization covered material that violates a 
person’s right to privacy,” 432 F. Supp. 2d at 491 (emphasis 
added).  According to Hymed, the “making known to” 
formulation makes abundantly clear the content-dependent 
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III. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
                                                                                                     
nature of the insurance coverage, whereas the “publishing” 
language of the Policy here requires coverage by virtue of the 
mere act of sending a fax, regardless of its content.  Hymed 
finds support for this distinction primarily in a First Circuit 
decision applying Massachusetts law.  See Cynosure, Inc. v. 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 645 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 
2011) (Souter, J., retired).  That distinction is unpersuasive as 
a matter of Pennsylvania law, however, in light of the 
Commonwealth’s definition of “publication” with respect to 
claims of invasion of privacy, which requires dissemination to 
the public at large.  OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co. v. Urban 
Outfitters, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d 426, 436-37 (E.D. Pa. 2014), 
aff’d, 625 F. App’x 177, 180 (3d Cir. 2015).  And, given 
Brethren’s contrary conclusion interpreting Pennsylvania law, 
the First Circuit’s view of Massachusetts law provides scant 
support for Hymed’s argument.  Were that not enough, we 
also note that the Seventh Circuit has twice concluded that the 
same “publication” language covers only invasions of the 
privacy interest in secrecy.  Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Websolv 
Computing, Inc., 580 F.3d 543, 551 (7th Cir. 2009); Am. 
States Ins. Co. v. Capital Assocs. of Jackson Cty., Inc., 392 
F.3d 939, 942-43 (7th Cir. 2004), declined to follow by Valley 
Forge Ins. Co. v. Swiderski Elecs., Inc., 860 N.E.2d 307, 323 
(Ill. 2006). 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge, dissenting, 
 I would dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  
In deciding that the amount-in-controversy threshold is 
satisfied, the majority adopts the reasoning in Meridian 
Security Insurance Company v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 539 
(7th Cir. 2006), to conclude that the rule against aggregation 
does not apply to this declaratory judgment action because “at 
the time of filing of the declaratory judgment complaint, 
Auto-Owners’s quarrel was with Stevens & Ricci regarding 
its indemnity obligation under the Policy . . . [and] [i]ts 
dispute was thus with its insured, not the class.”  Majority Op. 
at 21.  I write separately because I am unconvinced that this 
approach is permissible in light of the anti-aggregation rule, 
and believe that, in reaching its conclusion, the majority 
obfuscates our jurisprudence in two important areas.   
 First, the majority’s view that the instant controversy is 
“unitary” is questionable as a practical matter and creates 
tension with our previous decisions.  Plaintiff-Appellee Auto-
Owners Insurance Company named Appellant Hymed Group 
Corporation as a defendant in its declaratory action “in the 
hope of attaining a binding judgment against both the insured 
and the injured party,” American Automobile Insurance 
Company v. Murray, 658 F.3d 311, 319 (3d Cir. 2011); 
moreover, Hymed, not Stevens & Ricci, Inc., has been 
defending the suit from the beginning.   In other words, we 
are not presented with a unitary controversy between Auto-
Owners and Stevens & Ricci because, in reality, the presence 
of Hymed reflects the fact that a “controversy exist[s] 
between the insurance company and the injured [parties].”  Id. 
at 319.    
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  It is hard to conceive of what controversy actually 
exists between Auto-Owners and Stevens & Ricci given the 
fact that Stevens & Ricci has not so much as entered an 
appearance in the matter.  As Auto-Owners itself states in its 
Brief:  “Hymed and Auto-Owners are the parties currently 
engaged in the ‘real dispute’ that has reached this Court on 
appeal . . . and Hymed (and the class members) are the only 
ones that have a financial interest in the coverage issue . . . .”  
Appellee’s Supp. Br. at 12.     
 The notion that insurance coverage disputes occur only 
between the insurance company and its insured fits uneasily 
with our Article III standing decisions in which we have 
stressed that parties like Hymed have a significant stake.   See 
Murray, 658 F.3d at 319 (explaining that an injured party has 
a “particularized interest” in an insurance coverage suit 
“because a determination of . . . coverage would dictate its 
ability to receive the full benefit of the . . . lawsuit”); see also 
Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. Rauscher, 807 F.2d 345, 354 (3d 
Cir. 1986) (“Concluding that the injured party has an 
independent, and not a derivative right, to be heard, is not 
only jurisprudentially sound, but is also realistic[.]”).    
 As the majority notes, the import of its decision is that 
parties like Hymed cannot assert federal jurisdiction in 
declaratory actions seeking similar relief.  In my view, this 
retreats from our previous decisions emphasizing the 
particularized interest of the injured party.  The majority 
observes that “[s]tanding and amount-in-controversy are two 
distinct inquiries.” Majority Op. at 22.  It misses the point.  
My uneasiness with the majority’s characterization of 
coverage disputes arises from the practical anomaly of the 
real party in interest losing part of its stake in the suit.   
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 Further, I believe that the majority’s approach is 
essentially a run around the anti-aggregation rule.  We have 
prohibited measuring the amount-in-controversy by the 
defendant’s total cost on the basis that it violates anti-
aggregation principles.  In Packard v. Provident National 
Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1050 (3d Cir. 1993) we stressed that 
“allowing the amount in controversy to be measured by the 
defendant’s cost would eviscerate Snyder [v. Harris, 394 U.S. 
332 (1969)]’s holding that the claims of class members may 
not be aggregated in order to meet the jurisdictional 
threshold,” and thus declined to do so.  
 The majority’s response to this reasoning is that it is 
not aggregating but rather assessing the amount-in-
controversy as the total “value of the right being litigated” 
from the perspective of Auto-Owners.  Majority Op. at 24.  
On this point, the majority invokes the plaintiff’s viewpoint 
rule, under which the test for determining the amount-in-
controversy relies solely on the value of the benefit to the 
plaintiff.  In other words, the majority believes that because 
the defendant in the underlying action is now the plaintiff, the 
reasoning in Packard does not apply.   
 But the majority’s approach does not actually elude the 
aggregation of class members’ claims.  This becomes clear if 
we consider courts’ treatment of the “either viewpoint” 
approach, under which the amount-in-controversy is based on 
the pecuniary result to either party that would be produced by 
the judgment.  See 14AA Charles A. Wright et al., Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 3702.5 (4th ed. 2016).   
 Courts addressing the either-viewpoint approach have 
declined to adopt the rule in suits involving class actions, for 
the simple fact that total cost is the same as aggregation.  See 
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In re Ford Motor Co./Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 264 
F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2001).  This is exactly what we 
explained in Packard:  aggregation is not avoided by shifting 
perspective or semantics—whether one calls it “total cost” or 
“total detriment,” or “value of the right being litigated,” if one 
arrives at that total through aggregation of individual claims, 
it violates Snyder.  Concluding otherwise, we explained, 
disturbs long-standing anti-aggregation principles.   
 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has made the same 
point.  In Ford Motor Co., 264 F.3d at 958, class-action 
plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief invoked the “either 
viewpoint” rule and argued that the amount-in-controversy 
should be viewed as the total detriment to the defendant.   The 
court rejected this approach, because of the “inherent 
conflict” between the application of the approach and the 
anti-aggregation rule, explaining that “‘total detriment’ is 
basically the same thing as aggregation, and . . . where the 
equitable relief sought is but a means through which the 
individual claims may be satisfied, the ban on aggregation 
applies with equal force to the equitable as well as the 
monetary relief.”  Id. at 959. 
 Here, the relief requested is different but the 
implications are the same.  Auto-Owners asks us to view the 
amount-in-controversy as its total detriment on the 
presumption that this eludes application of the anti-
aggregation rule.  But the “inherent conflict” noted in Ford 
does not really disappear simply by assessing the amount-in-
controversy from the plaintiff-insurance company’s 
viewpoint.   This is because in a declaratory action, the court 
looks to the underlying suit to determine the amount in 
controversy. See e.g., Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 
873, 877 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he amount in controversy in a 
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petition to compel arbitration or appoint an arbitrator is 
determined by the underlying cause of action that would be 
arbitrated.”).1  That means, regardless of party status in the 
declaratory action, the plaintiff’s claim in the underlying suit 
still provides the basis from which we calculate the amount in 
controversy.  Put differently:  merely labeling the amount as 
the “total amount the insurance company will owe” does not 
sidestep the fact that, practically speaking, we are deriving 
that amount by aggregating the individual claims of the class 
members in the underlying suit.2 
 The majority believes that its approach is “consistent” 
with Ford.  Majority Op. at 23.  I disagree.  Ford 
straightforwardly explained that it would not consider the 
total detriment of the defendant in reaching the amount in 
controversy because “total detriment” and “aggregation” are 
one and the same.  Here, the majority concludes that total 
detriment and aggregation are not the same simply because 
                                                            
1  The majority calls this approach unprecedented.  But 
we have clearly suggested as much in Jumara.  Further, the 
proposition that we look to the underlying suit to determine 
the amount in controversy is apparent as a matter of common 
sense.   
 
2  This is so even if we adopt the fiction that because 
declaratory relief is sought, the controversy becomes unitary, 
only involving the insurer and its insured.  Even viewing this 
suit in this way, we do not derive the amount of controversy 
out of thin air—rather, we must look to the value of damages 
sought in the underlying suit.   
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the insurance company is the plaintiff in the declaratory 
action.  Rather than being consistent with Ford, the majority 
skirts the relevant point of Ford through a narrow focus on 
party status.     
 Thus to calculate the amount-in-controversy, I would 
do what our precedents suggest:  look to Hymed’s underlying 
suit to determine the amount in controversy.  In doing so, it is 
clear to a legal certainty that the amount-in-controversy is not 
met.  No single class member’s claim would exceed, or even 
come close to, the $75,000 threshold.   
 To be sure, the total amount potentially owed by Auto-
Owners also falls short of the $75,000 threshold.  The 
majority attempts to overcome this problem by tacking onto 
the amount the cost of hypothetical attorneys’ fees.  I also 
depart from this approach.  Generally, attorneys’ fees are not 
considered a part of the amount-in-controversy.  28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a); see also 14AA Charles A. Wright et al., Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 3712 (4th ed. 2016).  We have 
referenced a narrow exception to this rule when “the contracts 
at issue called for the payment of attorneys’ fees and costs by 
the party breaching the contract.”  State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. 
Co. v. Powell, 87 F.3d 93, 98 (3d Cir. 1996).  The policy 
between Auto-Owners and Stevens & Ricci (the “Policy”) is 
not an instrument of this sort.      
 The majority relies on Powell in concluding that 
attorneys’ fees are duly included here, but that case provides 
only apparent support.  In Powell, we declined to include 
arbitration costs in the amount-in-controversy because the 
policy at issue did “not specifically impose a duty to pay on 
the part of the [insurance company].” Id.   Similarly, the 
Policy contains no provision specifically imposing on Auto-
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Owners a duty to pay attorneys’ fees and costs.  While the 
majority points out that the Policy imposes on Auto-Owners a 
general “duty to defend,” this duty only applies to suits that 
fall within coverage.  Thus, it is not an unconditional 
requirement from which we could comfortably speculate as to 
costs that may be incurred.    
 The way the majority presents it, it might appear that 
Powell straightforwardly adopts the position it embraces.  Not 
so.  The full text of the language cited by the majority is as 
follows:   
As an initial matter, we question the reasoning 
of the district court’s decision in [Nationwide 
Mutual Insurance Company v. Rowles by 
Rowles, 818 F. Supp. 852 (1993)].  In arriving 
at its conclusion, the Rowles court relied upon 
two cases, [Springstead v. Crawfordsville State 
Bank, 231 U.S. 541 (1913)] and [Farmers 
Insurance Company v. McClain, 603 F.3d 821 
(10th Cir. 1979)] which held that costs and 
attorneys’ fees should be considered part of the 
amount in controversy for jurisdictional 
purposes when they are mandated by underlying 
instruments or contracts. In those two cases, 
however, the contracts at issue called for the 
payment of attorneys’ fees and costs by the 
party breaching the contract.  
Id. at 98.  What should be readily apparent is that the majority 
takes Powell out of context.  There, we did not hold that 
“costs and attorneys’ fees should be considered part of the 
amount in controversy for jurisdiction purposes when they are 
mandated by underlying instruments or contracts;” we merely 
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cited a district court case that made a conclusion to that 
effect.  The upshot of Powell’s holding is more limited—it is, 
where an underlying instrument does not “specifically impose 
a duty to pay” fees and costs, such costs are not duly included 
in the amount in controversy.  Id.  
 To be clear, I would agree that where a contract 
requires a breaching party to pay attorneys’ fees, those may 
be considered part of the amount in controversy—after all, in 
those contexts, “the costs [are] essentially additional damages 
to be assessed against the party found to have breached the 
instrument.”  Id.  This narrow exception to the general 
prohibition does not apply here.  Whatever fees and costs 
flowed from Auto-Owners’s duty to defend in its subsequent 
defense of Stevens & Ricci are entirely forward-looking—and 
as the majority opines, “federal diversity jurisdiction is 
generally determined based on the circumstances prevailing at 
the time the suit was filed.”  Majority Op. at 22 (citing 
Kaufman v. Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 561 F.3d 144, 152 (3d Cir. 
2009).   And these costs are not “essentially additional 
damages” Auto-Owners owes to Stevens & Ricci or vice 
versa, especially not as it relates to the declaratory judgment 
action.  It would be a different scenario if Stevens & Ricci 
sued Auto-Owners for breach of the Policy’s duty to defend.  
But that is not the situation we are presented with here.    
 In sum, the inclusion of attorneys’ fees here is an 
unnecessary expansion of our jurisprudence for which the 
majority articulates no basis.3  The majority believes that 
                                                            
3  The majority cites an influential treatise for the 
proposition that the law in this area is “quite settled.”  
Majority Op. at 25–26 n.18.  However, one treatise does not 
law make.  And, a closer look at the cases collected in that 
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those fees are an “inseparable” part of the controversy and to 
ignore them is to “ignore the reality of what is at stake in this 
litigation.”  Majority Op. at 26.  But in my view, by including 
these fees, the majority ignores the express language of 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(a) in the absence of any support from our 
Court.      
 “It is axiomatic that federal courts are courts of limited 
jurisdiction, and as such are under a continuing duty to satisfy 
themselves of their jurisdiction before proceeding to the 
merits of any case.”  Packard, 994 F.2d at 1049 (citations 
omitted).  Here, I am afraid the majority has “ben[t] over 
                                                                                                                                     
treatise demonstrates that what is “quite settled” is that where 
an underlying contract contains a fee-shifting provision, 
attorneys’ fees may be included in the amount-in-controversy, 
a point I do not dispute.  See 14AA Charles Alan Wright et 
al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3712 (4th ed. 2016).  
What is less settled, and has received less circuit attention, is 
the context we are presented with here—with only one circuit 
sharing the majority’s view and other circuits employing a 
similar approach only where the relevant defense or 
indemnification occurs before the declaratory suit is brought. 
See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 544 F.2d 198, 199 (5th Cir. 
1976) (per curiam) (cost of insurer’s prospective defense of 
insured provides basis for including attorneys’ fees); S. Ariz. 
York Refrigeration Co. v. Bush Mfg. Co., 331 F.2d 1, 18 (9th 
Cir. 1964) (attorneys’ fees included when defense has already 
occurred and indemnitor refused to defend); Farmers Ins. Co. 
v. McClain, 603 F.2d 821, 823 & 823 n.3 (10th Cir. 1979) 
(attorneys’ fees included when defense has already occurred).  
Far from settled then, the circuit law addressing this particular 
question is limited and inconclusive.   
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backwards . . . to persuade itself that subject matter 
jurisdiction exists.”  Travelers Prop. Cas. v. Good, 689 F.3d 
714, 718 (7th Cir. 2012).    
 Thus, because of the difficult fit between the 
majority’s reasoning and our Article III standing 
jurisprudence in similar contexts, the tension between the 
insurance-company viewpoint approach and the anti-
aggregation rule, and my reservations regarding the inclusion 
of the attorneys’ fees to reach the amount-in-controversy, I 
am not satisfied of our jurisdiction over this dispute.  I would 
dismiss the appeal on that ground and therefore respectfully 
dissent. 
